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CRIMINAL LAW - PUBLICITY OF PROCEEDINGS:
STUMBLING BLOCKS TO CLOSURE DURING CHILD
VICTIM'S TESTIMONY
Ernest Klein was convicted, following two jury trials, on two
counts of gross sexual imposition with a child under fifteen years of
age.' Due to a hung jury, the first trial did not return a verdict.
2
The second trial resulted in a conviction.3 Klem's adopted son was
the victim of the gross sexual imposition offenses.4 Although the
child had testified in a completely open and public courtroom dur-
ing the first trial, the state requested that the courtroom be
cleared at the second trial to facilitate the child's testimony and to
avoid embarrassing and distracting him.5 The defendant informed
his attorney that he objected to having the courtroom cleared,
however, the defendant's attorney stated at the bench that he had
no grounds for such an objection.' Consequently, the courtroom
was cleared except for court personnel, attorneys, jurors, the par-
ties, and a public media reporter.7 Following his conviction, the
defendant sought a new trial on the grounds that the trial court
abused its discretion and committed several errors. The errors
claimed included the trial court's exclusion of the public during
the child's testimony when findings adequate to support closure
1. State v. Klem, 438 N.W.2d 798, 799-800 (N.D. 1989). The two counts of gross sexual
imposition involved engaging in a sexual act with a person less than 15 years old and sexual
contact with a person less than 15 years old, both violations of section 12.1-20-03 of the
North Dakota Century Code. Klein, 438 N.W.2d at 799 & n.1. See N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-20-03 (1985 & Supp. 1989Xstatute indicating the elements of gross sexual imposition).
2. Klein, 438 N.W.2d at 800 n.3.
3. Id. at 799-800. The North Dakota Supreme Court subsequently reversed and
remanded the second trial of Klem. Id. at 803.
4. Id. at 799. At the time of the second trial, the boy was eleven. Jury Trial Transcript
at 552, State v. Klein, 438 N.W.2d 798 (N.D. 1989XNo. 01-CR87).
5. Klein, 438 N.W.2d at 799-800. The North Dakota Supreme Court quoted the
following dialog between the trial court and counsel for the state:
"MR. TESSIER: Because this is of a sensitive nature may I ask that the
Courtroom be cleared of all extraneous personnel? It may be very distracting
and very embarrassing for him in front of all these people and the people in the
Courtroom may inhibit the testimony.
"THE COURT: Any objections?
"[Klem's Attorney]: As the Court has stated, it's my client's case and I would like
to discuss that with him.
"THE COURT: Please do.
"[Klem's Attorney]: Excuse me, Your Honor. I'm sorry, he does object. I don't
have any grounds to object however.
'THE COURT: Very well. I think I will clear the Courtroom. Let's go back and
put it on the record."
Id. at 799.
6. Id. at 799. The state argued on appeal that since no grounds for objection were
offered at trial, the subsequent objection was invalid and unreviewable. Id. at 799-800.
However, the North Dakota Supreme Court ruled that any "articulated objection" was
sufficient response to an unsupported and untimely motion to close the trial. Id. at 800.
7. Id. at 799.
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had not been made, and evidence supporting closure had note
been advanced.8 Klein asserted that the exclusion of the public
under such circumstances deprived him of his sixth amendment
right to a public trial.9 The state maintained that Klein did not
preserve the issue for review because no grounds for an objection
were offered at trial."i Commenting on the motion for a new trial,
the trial court indicated that failure to state the grounds for an
objection at the time of the closure should alone have been suffi-
cient cause for denying a new trial." The trial court further noted
that any possible error was harmless because the sensitive nature
of the case, as well as the age of the victim, the psychological and
emotional pressures on the child, and the circumstances of a previ-
ous mistrial, clearly warranted closure. 12 Additionally, the court
noted that the trial had not been completely closed because a
member of the public media had remained, and other persons
would have been allowed to remain if the defendant had so
requested.'3  On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court
reversed the district court conviction and remanded the case for a
new trial.' 4 The supreme court held that before closing a trial dur-
8. Klein, 438 N.W.2d at 803-04. The defendant raised four other issues on appeal
including: 1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to excuse for cause two
jurors who had been exposed to pretrial publicity and did not state unequivocally that they
could be impartial; 2) whether the court erred in failing to submit to the jury the issue of
whether the prompt reporting requirement of § 12.1-20-01(3) of the North Dakota Century
Code had been met; 3) whether the court erred in permitting a witness to express an
opinion that a child was not "contaminated" when this opinion actually meant that the
child was telling the truth; and 4) whether the court abused its discretion in excluding the
polygraph evidence favorable to the defendant. Id.
9. Id. at 799.
10. Id. at 799-800. The North Dakota Supreme Court held that Klein's objection was
sufficient under the circumstances of an unsupported and untimely motion by the state for
closure. Id.
11. Transcript of Motions Hearing at 2, State v. Klem, 438 N.W.2d 798 (N.D. 1989XNo.
01-CR87). The North Dakota Supreme Court emphasized the impact of surprise to the
defendant, due to the timing of the request for closure, in excusing the faultiness of the
objection. Klemn, 438 N.W.2d at 800.
12. Transcript of Motions Hearing, supra note 11, at 3-5. The trial court's post trial
rationalization that its ruling in favor of closure would have been the same if it had held a
hearing and made findings was found unavailing by the North Dakota Supreme Court.
Klein, 438 N.W.2d at 802. The supreme court ruled that the hearing and findings must be
made before closure of the trial. Id.
13. Transcript of Motions Hearing, supra note 11, at 5-6. The North Dakota Supreme
Court ruled that the presence of the news reporter might have satisfied the public's first
amendment right to attend criminal trials, but it did not satisfy the defendant's sixth
amendment right to a public trial. Klein, 438 N.W.2d at 801.
14. Klein, 438 N.W.2d at 803. In his dissent in Klein, Chief Justice Erickstad argued
that the case should have been remanded for a hearing on the public trial issue and no new
trial should have been granted unless the hearing indicated it was warranted. Klein, 438
N.W.2d at 803 (Erickstad, CJ., dissenting). Because the dissent would not have remanded
for a new trial directly on the basis of the public trial issue, the dissenting opinion also
evaluated the remaining four issues. Id. at 808 (Erickstad, C.J., dissenting). See supra note
8 for a list of the four remaining issues raised on appeal in Klein. On the first of the
remaining four issues, regarding juror partiality, the dissent found that a juror's partiality
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ing a child witness' testimony, the court must conduct a hearing
and make findings showing that the child needs protection. Is Fur-
thermore, the supreme court ruled that the trial court must show
it considered alternatives to closure and that any closure would be
no broader than necessary to protect the child.16 State v. Klein,
438 N.W.2d 798 (N.D. 1989).
Since before the days of the Norman conquest of England the
judiciary has evinced a strong preference for open and public
trial.i Scholars may debate why such a preference developed,
but its firm establishment since antiquity seems undisputed.' 8 In
wa s a question of fact for the trial court. Klein, 438 N.W.2d at 811. A trial court's resolution
of that question is properly presumed correct and should not be reversed unless the trial
court clearly abused its discretion. Id. The dissent did not find, in its review of the record,
that the trial court had abused its discretion in interpreting the jurors' responses and
consequent refusal to dismiss the challenged jurors for cause. Id.
On the second of the remaining issues relating to the prompt reporting requirement,
the defendant argued that there was a dispute regarding when the offense was reported
because a doctor's report stated the year of the alleged offense at 1984 instead of 1985.
Klein, 438 N.W.2d at 811. An accurate reporting date was important for statute of
limitation purposes. Id. The dissent found there was no actual dispute regarding the time
since the testimony of the doctor explained that the 1984 date on the doctor's report was an
error, and all witnesses agreed on the date. Id.
The third remaining issue dealt with the admission of evidence on the subject of
testimonial contamination. Id. The dissent found the doctor's explanation of how a child
witness' testimony can be contaminated by leading questions, together with the doctor's
opinion that this had not happened to the child in this case, were properly admitted. Kleia,
438 N.W.2d at 812.
On the final issue, regarding the exclusion of the polygraph evidence, the dissent noted
that polygraph test results are not ordinarily admissible in North Dakota criminal trials
unless the parties have stipulated to their admissibility. Id. at 813. The parties made no
stipulation in this case. Id. The dissent also indicated that the defense failed to offer
foundation evidence indicating that the polygraph test was accepted as reliable by the
scientific community. Id.
In conclusion, the dissent indicated that the case should be reassigned to a district court
judge from outside the district who had no prior contact with the case to encourage a new
and independent review of the issue. Klera, 438 N.W.2d at 813. Hence, if the new court
concluded that the public was properly excluded, a new judgment of conviction should be
entered. Id.
15. Klein, 438 N.W.2d at 801-02. The test for closure as formulated by the United
States Supreme Court provides:
[The party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest
that is likely to be prejudiced, the closure must be no broader than necessary to
protect that interest, the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to
closing the proceeding, and it must make findings adequate to support the
closure.
Id. at 801 (quoting Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984)).
16. Klein, 438 N.W.2d at 801.
17. See Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564-65 (1980XSupreme
Court reversed a trial court's ruling to close a murder trial). In an opinion in which Chief
Justice Burger announced the judgment of the court, he summarized the history of Anglo-
American criminal jurisprudence, citing the works of numerous legal scholars. Richmond
Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 558, 564-73. He concluded, "[f]rom this unbroken, uncontradicted
history, supported by reasons as valid today as in centuries past, we are bound to conclude
that a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under our
system of justice." Id. at 573.
18. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 558-73 (summary of the development and
history of public trials in English and American legal history). See also Note, The First
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America, this ancient precedent solidified into a constitutional
right - the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution
which provides: "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. . ."19 Through the
fourteenth amendment, this right applies to the states.20 This con-
stitutional right to a public trial is intended to protect the accused
from unjust prosecution and to assure that participants perform
their functions fairly and responsibly, knowing they are under
public scrutiny.21 The United States Supreme Court has also
endorsed a proposition asserting that, in addition to benefiting the
accused, open trials benefit the public in several ways.' First,
public attendance at criminal proceedings assures the public that
Amendment Right of Access to Sex Crime Trials, 22 B.C. L. REv. 361, 366-67
(1981) hereinafter Note, Right ofAccess](mapping a common law right of access to criminal
trials); Note, The First Amendment and Mandatory Courtroom Closure in Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Superior Court: The Press' Right, the Child Rape Victim's Plight, 11 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 637, 640-41 (1984)Xhereinafter Note, Courtroom Closure]restating the history
of the public trial from Richmond Newspapers and citing additional sources in agreement
with that history); Supreme Court Review, Sixth Amendment-Public Trial Guarantee
Applies to Pretrial Suppression Hearings, 75 J. CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 802, 806-07 &
n.40 (1984)Xhereinafter, Supreme Court Review, Public Trial GuaranteeAsummarizing
United States Supreme Court opinions that discuss the history of public trials in America).
While the preference for open criminal trials may indeed be well established, an argument
has been made that an exception to this preference is equally well established for sex crime
trials. See Comment, Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1353,
1363-65 & nn. 85, 86, 91 (1983Xhereinafter Comment, Globe Newspaperydocumenting
circumstances limiting traditional access to criminal trials and suggesting the existence of
an historical preference for closure during trials of sex crimes involving minors).
19. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense.
Id.
20. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 379 (1979).
21. Id. at 380. The United States Supreme Court in Gannett reaffirmed that the sixth
amendment public trial protection is to ensure fair trials in which the accused is not
unjustly condemned: Id. at 380. The Court discussed the scope and importance of this
right during its determination of whether or not a defendant may compel a private trial.
Id. at 382-83. In Gannett, following the disappearance during a fishing trip of a suburban
Rochester, New York man, the petitioner's two local newspapers carried extensive
coverage of the investigation, the evidence, police theories, and the arrest and history of
the defendants. Id. at 371-75. The defense counsel argued that the defendants' ability to
receive fair trials was jeopardized by the publicity, hence, the public and press should be
excluded from the suppression hearing. Id. at 375. With no objections offered, the defense
motion was granted by the trial court. Id. The following day an employee of the petitioner
newspaper sought access to the transcript and a hearing on the matter was scheduled. Id.
Citing "probability of prejudice," the trial judge refused to change his order. Id. at 376.
The decision was appealed, eventually gaining certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court which reversed the trial court. Gannett, 443 U.S. 368, 376-77.
22. Id. at 383. See also Note, Right of Access, supra note 18, at 365-66 (claiming that
public trials serve numerous political and educational functions and that the public has a
substantial interest in access to criminal trials).
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the laws are being enforced and the justice system is functioning
properly. s3 Second, even for those members of the public who do
not attend, simply knowing that anyone may attend and see for
themselves that appropriate standards of fairness are being main-
tained enhances their confidence in criminal proceedings.24 The
resulting appearance of fairness serves a therapeutic function in
society, providing an outlet for emotion and reaction, especially
where the criminal act caused public outrage and provoked a pub-
lic desire to retaliate.2- Closed proceedings, the Supreme Court
has indicated, eliminate that outlet for public outrage and could
frustrate public desire to see that an offender is made to account
for his actions.26 Finally, the Court indicated that open proceed-
ings may encourage higher quality testimony and induce other-
wise unknown witnesses to come forward. 7
However, the Supreme Court did not find any constitutionally
guaranteed public right to attend criminal trials in the sixth
amendment,' The Justices stated in 1979 that, "[riecognition of
an independent public interest in the enforcement of Sixth
Amendment guarantees is a far cry... from the creation of a con-
stitutional right on the part of the public."2 9 Nevertheless, the fol-
lowing year, the court found implicit in the first amendment to the
United States Constitution a constitutional public right to attend
criminal trials.
30
23. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1984)(hereinafter
Press-Enterprise I].
24. Id. at 508.
25. Id. at 508-09. See also Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 570
(198OXstating open trials serve a therapeutic function).
26. Press-Enterprise 1, 464 U.S. at 508-09.
27. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 383.
28. Id. Although Gannett involved the closure of a pre-trial hearing, the United States
Supreme Court opinion indicated the holding applied to public access to criminal trials as
well. Id. at 391. See Note, Right to Access, supra note 18, at 369-70 (stating the rejection of
a sixth amendment public access right, while contained in dicta and not distinguishing
between pre-trial and trial closures, heavily burdened any future attempts to recognize
such a right).
29. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 383. The Supreme Court recognized that the public has an
important and traditional interest in open proceedings and a defendant has a constitutional
sixth amendment right to a public trial. Id. at 382-83. The Supreme Court's plurality
opinion in Gannett, however, found no constitutional public right to attend trials. Id. at
383-84. Justice Powell alone believed a first amendment right to attend trials existed, but
agreed closure was appropriate in the Gannett case because even such a constitutional right
is limited by the government's need to protect confidential information, the defendant's
interest in a fair trial, and the government's interest in convictions. Gannett, 443 U.S. at
397-98 (Powell, J., concurring).
30. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580. At the beginning of the fourth trial for
murder, after three minstrials, the defendant requested the proceedings be closed. Id. at
559. The request for closure was granted, and following a hearing, the trial court denied
Richmond Newspapers' motion to vacate. Id. at 561. Upon appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, the Court determined there was, implicit in the first amendment, a
constitutional right granted to the public to attend criminal trials. Id. at 580.
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The first amendment provides, "[c]ongress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peacefully to assemble .. ." The Supreme Court
explained that free speech includes the freedom to listen, to
receive ideas and information. 2 Without protecting a right to
seek out and gather information and news, the first amendment
could not protect freedom of the press. 3 Similarly, the right to
communicate regarding the happenings of a trial would have little
meaning if the opportunity to observe the proceedings could be
arbitrarily denied. 4 Further, pointing out that people may assem-
ble to listen, observe, and learn and that the exercise of first
amendment rights are limited by traditional time, place, and man-
ner restrictions, the Court indicated that a trial courtroom is a
public place where people have a right to assemble.35
Despite the logical reasons supporting the right to a public
trial, public access may hinder a fair trial, such as when news cov-
erage of a pretrial suppression hearing leads to an extensive
buildup of prejudicial publicity. 6 Public access may also conflict
with other important interests, such as the government's need to
protect confidential and secret information, the identity of infor-
mants,37 or a child witness.3 8 While the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged in 1979 that some interests may limit the scope of the
Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court, noting, "Absent an overriding
interest articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public."
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581.
31. See U.S. CONST. amend I. The first amendment provides, "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id. The first
amendment applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Richmond
Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575.
32. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 576 (Burger, CJ., plurality opinion). Although
Richmond Newspapers was a plurality decision, a majority of the court recognized a first-
amendment-based public right of access. See Note, Courtroom Closure, supra note 18, at
647-48 (summarizing the various opinions in Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 554, and
indicating that only one justice failed to recognize a constitutional public right of access).
33. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 576 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion). While a
majority of the court did recognize a public right of access to criminal trials based on the
first amendment, the justices disagreed regarding the scope and foundation of the right
within the first amendment. See Note, Right of Access, supra note 18, at 372-74 (analyzing
the differing first amendment foundations recognized in the various Richmond Newspapers
opinions); Note, Courtroom Closure, supra note 18, at 647-50 (discussing, first, the
foundation of the public access right and, second, the scope of that right as recognized by
the various opinions).
34. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 576-77.
35. Id. at 578. See also Note, Right of Access, supra note 18, at 373-74 (characterizing
the right to assemble to watch criminal trials as a conventional first amendment analysis in
contrast with a new recognition of a right to gather information).
36. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 375, 394.
37. Id. at 398 (Powell, J., concurring).
38. Richmond, 448 U.S. at 600 n.5 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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public trial right,39 a test for balancing those interests was not pro-
vided until 1982 in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court.4"
Globe was a rape trial in which the victims were minors.4 '
The trial was closed pursuant to a Massachusetts statute which
provided
[a]t the trial of a complaint or indictment for rape, incest,
carnal abuse or other crime involving sex, where a minor
under eighteen years of age is the person upon, with or
against whom the crime is alleged to have been commit-
ted, . . . the presiding justice shall exclude the general
public from the courtroom, admitting only such persons
as may have a direct interest in the case.42
Relying on this statute, the lower court ordered the trial closed,
and despite objections from the Globe Newspaper Company, the
newspaper was denied access to the courtroom.43 The Globe
Newspaper Company sought relief from this order by appealing to
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 44  The Supreme
Judicial Court dismissed the Globe Newspaper Company's appeal,
but ruled that closure was mandatory under the Massachusetts
statute only during the minor victim's testimony.45 The court
stated that further closure would be left to the trial judge's
discretion.46
The Globe Newspaper Company appealed to the United
States Supreme Court.47 Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that
39. See Gannett, 443 U.S. at 393-94 (Court affirmed closure where decision was based
on balancing competing societal issues) and Id. at 397-98 (Powell, J., concurringXdiscussing
possible limits on public access to criminal trials); Richmond, 448 U.S. at 600 n.5 (Steward,
J., concurringXconsiderations that might justify closure). See also Note, Right of Access,
supra note 18, at 374 (stating that the entire Supreme Court recognized the public trial
right was not absolute).
40. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
41. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 598 (1982). In Globe, the
defendant was charged with "forcible rape and forced unnatural rape" of three teenage
girls. Id.
42. Id. at 598-99 n.1. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16A (West 1981).
43. Globe, 457 U.S. at 599.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 600.
46. Globe, 457 U.S. at 600. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts did not
render an opinion until after the conclusion of the trial and ruled on the merits because of
the importance of the issue. Id. The court determined that section 16A of Chapter 278 of
the Massachusetts General Laws was intended to encourage child victims of sexual offenses
to come forward and to protect them from psychological harm, thereby preserving their
ability to testify. Id. Therefore, the court reasoned, closure was mandatory only when the
minor victims were testifying and that closing other portions was a matter of judicial
discretion. Id.
47. Globe, 457 U.S. at 601. The United States Supreme Court remanded for
consideration in light of recently decided Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
Globe, 457 U.S. at 601. Upon remand, the Massachusetts court adhered to its position, not
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the Massachusetts statute violated the first amendment, and the
Court reversed the decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court.4s While the Supreme Court agreed that protecting minor
victims of sex crimes and encouraging them to testify were com-
pelling interests, those interests did not justify mandatory closure
of a courtroom.4 9 The test for determining when closure of a crim-
inal trial would be appropriate was whether closure is "necessi-
tated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest."5° Mandatory closure, the Court
concluded, was not "narrowly tailored" because closure might not
be necessary in all cases.5 The Supreme Court then set forth a
narrowly tailored approach that required a case-by-case analysis,
weighing factors such as "the minor victim's age, psychological
maturity and understanding, the nature of the crime, the desires
of the victim, and interests of parents and relatives."5 "
The Supreme Court provided further guidance on the ques-
reading Richmond Newspapers to require invalidation of section 16A of chapter 278 of the
Massachusetts General Laws. Globe, 457 U.S. at 601-02. Further, the Massachusetts court
pointed out that the important interests advanced of encouraging child victims of sex
crimes to come forward and protecting them from psychological harm when they testify at
trial "would be defeated if a case-by-case determination were used." Id. (quoting Globe
Newspaper v. Superior Court, 383 Mass. 838, 851, 423 N.E.2d 773, 779 (1981)). The case
again returned to the United States Supreme Court which reversed the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court and ruled that section 16A of chapter 278 of the Massachusetts
General Laws was unconstitutional. Globe, 457 U.S. at 602.
48. Globe, 457 U.S. at 610-11.
49. Id. at 607-08.
50. Id. at 607.
51. Globe, 457 U.S. at 609. The United States Supreme Court commented that the
state's legitimate interest could be served by requiring a case-by-case determination of
whether the state's concern for the well-being of the child witness necessitated closure. Id.
Further, the court faulted the commonwealth because "no empirical support" was offered
to show that mandatory closure would increase the number of victims coming forward to
cooperate. Id.
52. Globe, 457 U.S. at 608. Three justices registered strong dissents in Globe. Id. at
612, 620. One dissent pointed out the anomaly that results when minors charged with rape
automatically receive more protection than the minor victims of rape. Id. at 612 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger noted that historically our society has made great
efforts to protect minors charged with crime. Id. But, he further noted, though states may
mandate the closing of all proceedings in order to protect a 17-year-old charged with rape,
they may not require the closing of even part of a criminal proceeding in order to protect
the innocent child rape victim. Id. at 612. Another dissenting Justice stated that the
question of the constitutionality of the Massachusetts statute was premature because the
statute, as interpreted by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, had never been
applied. Globe, 457 U.S. at 623 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This second dissenting opinion
further noted that "'the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court narrowly construed - and
then upheld in the abstract - the statute that the trial court had read to mandate the
closure of the entire trial." Id. at 620. The statute as interpreted by the Supreme Judicial
Court had never been applied in an actual controversy. Id. Therefore, the dissent viewed
the question as a hypothetical and the majority opinion -as providing no guidance in
resolving the conflicting interests. Id. at 621, 623. See also Comment, Globe Newspaper,
supra note 18, at 1359 (analysis of Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Globe indicating that the
dissent is of particular interest because the Chief Justice was the author of the majority
opinion in Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 554, upon which the majority in Globe relied).
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tion of when a courtroom proceeding may be closed in its discus-
sion in Press-Enterprise Company v. Superior Court of California,
(Press-Enterprise I).3 In Press-Enterprise I, the trial court closed
the preliminary jury examination proceedings in a trial involving
the rape and murder of a teenager,5 4 The closure was not for the
protection of a minor, however, but rather to insure juror candor
and to protect both the jurors' right to privacy and the defendant's
right to a fair trial.' Although some sensitive and private areas of
the jurors past experiences were discussed during the six weeks of
jury examination proceedings, only three days out of those six
weeks were open to the public.56
In Press-Enterprise I, the Supreme Court applied and
expanded the Globe test.57 The Court restated the test as follows:
"The presumption of openness may be overcome only by an over-
riding interest based on findings that closure is essential to pre-
serve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest. 5 85 The Supreme Court required clear articulation of the
interest and specific findings to facilitate review.59 Applying the
expanded test to the facts in Press-Enterprise I, the Supreme Court
determined that the trial court's findings were insufficient to show
that the two compelling interests, the defendant's right to a fair
trial and the prospective jurors' privacy rights, were threatened by
an open proceeding.10 Further, even had there been adequate
findings, the trial court had not considered whether there were
alternatives available to adequately guard those interests.6 1 With-
53. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
54. Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 503 (1984XPress-Enterprise 1).
55. Id. at 503-04. Both counsel for the defendant and the prosecutor agreed that
closure and sealing of the transcript was proper. Id. at 504.
56. Id. at 503-04. The trial judge stated that "while most of the information is dull and
boring, some of the jurors had some special experiences in sensitive areas that do not
appear to be appropriate for public discussion." Id. at 504.
57. Press-Enterprise 1, 464 U.S. at 509-10 (Chief Justice Burger, author of a strong
dissent in Globe, 457 U.S. at 607, delivered the opinion).
58. Press-Enterprise 1, 464 U.S. at 510. The Globe test stated, "Where... the State
attempts to deny the right of access in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive
information, it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental
interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest." Globe, 457 U.S. at 606-07.
59. Press-Enterprise 1, 464 U.S. at 510. In Press-Enterprise I, the United States
Supreme Court indicated that the trial judge should have explained why the information
was sensitive and entitled to privacy and why the closure order was not limited to that
information. Id. at 513.
60. Id. at 510-11. In addition to making findings showing the state's asserted interests
were threatened by an open proceeding, the trial judge should explain why the matter
under discussion or contained in the transcript is entitled to privacy. Id. at 513.
61. Press-Enterprise 1, 464 U.S. at 511. When a closure order was requested, the trial
judge could have required a prospective juror to make an affirmative request that personal
information not be disclosed. Id. at 512. A concurring opinion suggested that a court
should be required to show that any closure order constitutes "the least restrictive means
available for protecting compelling state interests." Id. at 520 (Marshall, J., concurring).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:715
out considering alternatives, the Supreme Court found, no conclu-
sion that closure was warranted could possibly be drawn.62
Within a few months of the Press-Enterprise I decision, the
Supreme Court again addressed the issue of closing proceedings to
the public in Waller v. Georgia,' in which a suppression hearing
was closed to protect people who were not on trial at the time. 4
Unlike Globe I and Press-Enterprise I,6 the objection to closure in
Waller came from the defendant and triggered an analysis in
terms of the sixth amendment rather than the first amendment.
6 7
In Waller, the Supreme Court unanimously concluded the
requirements for closure were the same regardless of whether the
right affected was found in the first amendment or the sixth
amendment. The Court first quoted the test from Press-Enter-
prise I for determining when a criminal proceeding could be
closed. 69 After emphasizing the importance of the sixth amend-
ment and the benefit provided to the defendant by open trials, the
Court restated the requirements that must be met to properly
close a criminal proceeding. 0 The party seeking closure "must
advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the
closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest,
the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the
proceedings, and it must make findings adequate to support the
closure."7
1
62. Id. at 511.
63. 467 U.S. 39 (1984).
64. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 42 (1984). With court authority, wiretaps had been
placed on phones, revealing a large lottery operation which involved gambling on the
volume of the New York Stock Exchange. Id. at 41. The petitioners were indicted along
with 35 others. Id. Trials were held separately and the prosecutor was concerned that
wiretap evidence relating to those persons not yet on trial could be tainted and legally not
admissible in future prosecutions. Id. at 42.
65. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
66. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
67. Waller, 467 U.S. at 42 n.2, 43. The court agreed that the public trial guarantee of
the sixth amendment applied to a pretrial suppression hearing as well as a trial. Id. at 47.
68. Waller, 467 U.S. at 44-46. See generally Comment, Public Trial Guarantee, supra
note 18 (analysis of the Waller opinion criticizing the unpredictability of the test and lack of
guidance in identifying an "overriding interest").
69. Waller, 467 U.S. at 45. In Press-Enterprise I, the Court stated the test as follows:
"The presumption of openness may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on
findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve
that interest." Press-Enterprise 1, 464 U.S. at 510.
70. Id. at 48.
71. Id. Protecting the privacy interest of persons and protecting information from
unnecessary publication that could render it inadmissible under state law could be an
overriding interest sufficient to support the closure of a hearing. Id. However, in
advancing this interest, the state in Waller was not specific in explaining whose privacy
interest was in danger of being infringed, how it would be infringed, which portions of the
tapes could infringe it, and which portion of the evidence consisted of tapes. Id. Further,
the court did not consider alternatives such as obtaining more information in private and
only closing those portions of the hearing which endangered the interest advanced. Id. at
724
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The Waller Court also addressed the issue of appropriate
relief when a proceeding was improperly closed.7 2 Concluding
that the defendant need not show specific prejudice if the trial was
improperly closed, the Court nevertheless ruled that a new trial
was not necessary unless a new and public suppression hearing
rendered substantially different results.73
In Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, (Press-
Enterprise 11),74 unlike Waller,7 5 the defendant requested a closed
suppression hearing and the media challenged denial of access.7 6
The Supreme Court applied the test from Press-En terprise 117 and
pointed out that the same considerations which led the Court to
apply the first amendment public right of access to criminal trials
in Richmond Newspapers78 and Globe,7 9 and to the jury selection
process in Press-Enterprise I8 led the Court to conclude that this
first amendment right also applied to the preliminary hearing in
Press-Enterprise 11.81
The historical preference for open criminal proceedings was
an important consideration of the United States Supreme Court in
recognizing a public right of access to court proceedings in crimi-
nal cases.8 2 However, as Chief Justice Burger stated in his dissent
in Globe, "[i]t would misrepresent the historical record to state
that there is an 'unbroken, uncontradicted history' of open pro-
ceedings in cases involving the sexual abuse of minors."3 Early
48-49. Additionally, the United States Supreme Court observed that the Georgia Supreme
Court's post hoc assertion, that the trial court had balanced the petitioners' right to a public
hearing against the privacy rights of others, could not solve the deficiencies of the trial
court's record. Id. at 49 n.8.
72. Waller, 467 U.S. at 49.
73. Id. at 49-50. The Supreme Court held that if essentially the same evidence was
suppressed in a subsequent hearing, then, a new trial would be a windfall for the defendant
and not serve the public interest. id. at 50.
74. 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
75. 467 U.S. 39 (1984).
76. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 478 U.S. 1, 3-5
(1986)[hereinafter Press-Enterprise I1]. The defendant, a nurse accused of murdering 12
patients, requested the preliminary hearing be closed to protect his right to a fair trial
because the case had attracted national publicity. Id.
77. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
78. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
79. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
80. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
81. Press-Enterprise 11, 478 U.S. at 9-10.
82. Id. at 8.
83. Globe, 457 U.S. at 614. See Note, Courtroom Closure, supra note 18, at 658 & n.
163 (citing the Chief Justice's dissent and summarizing the lower court decisions used to
support his view); Comment, Globe Newspaper, supra note 18, at 1363-65 & nn. 65, 86, 91
(documenting circumstances limiting traditional access to criminal trials and suggesting the
existence of an historical preference for closure during trials of sex crimes involving
minors). An example of such limiting circumstances is a Mississippi Supreme Court case
indicating that the trial court had discretion to exclude all persons except those necessary to
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cases in the United States indicate that portions of the public rou-
tinely were excluded to protect society's morals."
Over time the attitudes in American society changed and
were reflected in the courts as judges shifted emphasis from the
protection of the child spectator at a trial involving sexual miscon-
duct to a concern for protecting the child witness and victim.' By
closing trials to the general public, the courts of several states
hoped to reduce the trauma to the child victim by sparing them
the embarrassment, humiliation, shame, or fear that could result
conduct the trial in prosecutions for adultery, rape, fornication, sodomy, and crimes against
nature. Sallie v. State, 155 Miss. 547, _, 124 So. 650, 651 (1929).
84. See Note, Right of Access, supra note 18, at 363 (citing examples from the late
1800's and early 1900's approving exclusion of the public from criminal trials where the
evidence was considered likely to damage public morality). See also Green v. State, 135 Fl
17, _ 184 So. 504, 506-07 (1938Xrape of 15-year-old girl; "if there is any testimony which
might be revolting to ladies or others, they will have to retire;" "[the mere fact that some
witness may be called who is not willing to testify freely in regard to certain facts before
spectators is not sufficient"); Lancaster v. State, 168 Ga. 470, _ 148 S.E. 139, 142
(1929Xrape trial; "all trials are normally and properly open to the public, except where, in
the court's discretion, the evidence tends to debauch the morals of the young"); State v.
Smith, 90 Utah 482, -, 62 P.2d 1110, 1115 (1936Xstatutory rape case; "a regard to public
morals and public decency would require that at least the young be excluded from hearing
and witnessing the evidences of human depravity which the trial must necessarily bring to
light").
85. See Globe, 457 U.S. 596, 598, 600 (challenging closure mandated by statute to
protect child witnesses); United States ex rel. Latimore v. Sielaff, 561 F.2d 691,694 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1076 (1978Xrape of 21-year-old woman: "[p]rimary justification
for [closure] lies in protection of the personal dignity of the complaining witness"); Harris v.
Stephens, 361 F.2d 888, 891 (8th Cir. 1966) cert. denied, 386 U.S. 964 (brutal rape of a 23-
year-old woman; closing was a "frequent and accepted practice when the lurid details of
such a crime must be related by a young lady"); Geise v. United States, 262 F.2d 151, 157
(9th Cir. 1958), rehg denied, 265 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 842
(1959Xrape of eight-year-old child where two other witnesses were ages seven to eleven;
court may close to protect a child witness from embarrassment caused by testifying to
delicate or revolting factsXquoting with approval U.S. v. Geise, 158 F. Supp. 821, 824 (D.
Alaska, 1958), reh'g denied 167 F. Supp. 775 (D. Alaska, 1958), aff'd, 262 F.2d 151 (9th Cir.
1958)); United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919, 922-23 (3rd Cir. 1949Xyouthful spectators may
be excluded when evidence contains scandalous or indecent matters, however, "whatever
may have been the view in an earlier and more formally modest age, "adults could not be
excluded on the grounds of public morality; but where the prosecuting witness was "of such
tender years as to be seriously embarrassed in giving her testimony" before spectators, the
judge may order closure); State v. Smith, 123 Ariz. 243, -, 599 P.2d 199, 205
(1979X"protection of the dignity of the complaining witness in a rape case is a substantial
justification for excluding spectators"); State v. Purvis, 157 Conn. 198, _, 251 A.2d 178, 182
(1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 928 (1969Xrape of 16-year-old child); Beauchamp v. Cahill, 297
Ky. 505, _, 180 S.W.2d 423, 424 (1944Xcontributing to the delinquency of a 15-year-old
girl; judge had power to exclude the young and protect a child witness by excluding
spectators); Commonwealth v. Blondin, 324 Mass. 564, 87 N.E.2d 455 (1949), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 984 (1950Xrape of 16-year-old child); State v. Schmit, 273 Minn. 78, _, 139 N.W.2d
800, 805-07 (1966Xorder excluding spectators except news reporters during a trial for
carnal knowledge was error; protection of public morals was dubious in light of newspaper
coverage, and mere embarrassment of an adult witness was insufficient justification); State
ex rel. Baker v. Utecht; 221 Minn. 145, _. 21 N.W.2d 328, 331 (1946), cert. denied, 327 U.S.
810 (1946Xwhere evidence relates to indecent or immoral matters, the judge may exclude
children and also exclude spectators to alleviate the embarrassment of a child "witness);
State v. Holm, 67 Wyo. 360, -, 224 P.2d 500, 508 (1950Xin trial regarding the statutory
rape of a 14-year-old child, court excluded spectators due to age of witness and nature of
case).
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from revealing such experiences to a large crowd of strangers.
8
Further, trial courts often reasoned that in addition to sparing the
chid victim from further injury, courtroom closure would improve
the child's testimony because the child would more freely commu-
nicate the information.8 7  Closure might also increase the fre-
quency with which child victims and their families would
cooperate with the justice system by agreeing to testify and go
through the ordeal of a trial. 8
In a 1909 North Dakota case, State v. Nyhus, 9 the trial court
closed the trial of a defendant accused of raping a young girl. °
However, members of the jury, officers of the court, parties, wit-
nesses, and other persons the parties had requested to stay were
allowed to remain.9 ' Although he offered no objections at trial,
the defendant appealed claiming he had been denied the right to
a public trial.9 2 The North Dakota Supreme Court emphasized
the importance of the public trial right, noting that this right was
86. See Note, Right of Access, supra note 18, at 363-64 (interests favoring closure of a
sex crime trial); Note, Courtroom Closure, supra note 18, at 642-43 (protecting victims in a
sex crime trial); Comment, Globe Newspaper: No Shield for the Child Witness, 15 U. WEST
LA. L. REv. 109, 110-11 (1983)Xhereinafter Comment, Child Witnews]history of closure to
protect child witnesses).
87. See Hogan v. State, 191 Ark. 437, _, 86 S.W.2d 931, 932 (1935Xfrightened and
embarrassed 10-year-old rape victim failed to testify effectively before crowded courtroom
audience; judge properly ordered the courtroom cleared on the basis that the crowded
courtroom interfered with the orderly administration of justice); State v. Workman, 14 Ohio
App. 3d 385, 471 N.E.2d 853, 860 (Ohio App. 1984Xcourtroom cleared of unnecessary
people during testimony of nervous and soft-spoken witnesses under ten years of age in
order to spare them embarrassment and eliminate excess noise); State v. Damm, 62 S.D.
123, - 252 N.W. 7, 10 (1934X13-year-old rape victim became embarrassed, disturbed and
began crying while being questioned by the state; the court ordered the courtroom cleared
of spectators, except for a newspaper reporter, for the remainder of the child's testimony);
Mosby v. State, 703 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985X"The protection of witnesses from
embarrassment or intimidation so extreme that it would traumatize them or render them
unable to testify is a state interest sufficiently weighty to justify partial or complete;
exclusion of the public"). See also supra notes 85-86 for additional cases and commentaries
on closure for the protection of child witnesses.
88. See Commonwealth v. Hobbs, 385 Mass. 863, -, 434 N.E.2d 633, 638
(1982X"Exclusion of the public protects witnesses' ability to testify by removing a source of
fear, confusion, and distraction, and may encourage victims to report and prosecute
crimes").
89. 19 N.D. 326, 124 N.W. 71 (1909).
90. State v. Nyhus, 19 N.D. 328, 329, 124 N.W. 71, 72 (1909). The defendant was
charged with rape in the first degree upon a female less than 14 years of age. Id. at 328, 124
N.W. at 71.
91. Id. at 329, 124 N.W. at 72. In making the closure order, the trial court noted that
the Nyhus case involved what was "commonly known as scandalous matter." Id. at 329,
124 N.W. at 72.
92. Nyhus, 19 N.D. at 329, 124 N.W. at 72. The North Dakota Supreme Court noted
that except for an inference from the fact that the closure order was enforced, the record
did not show that anyone seeking admission to the courtroom was excluded or that the
defendant desired anyone's presence. Id. at 329-30, 124 N.W. at 72. Nevertheless, the
defendant claimed enforcement of the closure order deprived him of a public trial. Id. at
329-30, 124 N.W. at 71-72.
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created to benefit the accused by preventing secret trials. 3 How-
ever, the court further explained that the public trial right was
qualified and could be limited by such aspects as seating capacity,
maintaining orderly conduct in the courtroom, and the exclusion
of children during discussions of matters then considered
immoral.94 Concluding that "public" was the equivalent of "not
secret," the North Dakota Supreme Court in Nyhus found no prej-
udicial error was committed because the defendant was not
restricted as to the number of people he could request to remain
in the courtroom 5 Significantly, throughout the opinion, the pri-
mary concern was the propriety of allowing members of the pub-
lic, especially children, to hear the testimony, rather than concern
for the child victim's welfare. 6
North Dakota case law then apparently remains silent on the
issue until a 1980 case indicated that limitations on the right of the
public to attend trials still included the size of the courtroom and
the need to prevent disturbances and dangerous situations.97 The
North Dakota Supreme Court also identified other limitations on
the public's right to attend trials: preventing excessive dissemina-
tion of important information during crucial times, insuring a fair
trial and just convictions, and preserving the confidentiality of
informants and sensitive information.9 The court cited section
27-01-02 of the North Dakota Century Code, which dictates that
the sittings of every court are to be public to allow any citizen to
attend but also provides that the judge may use discretion to
93. Nyhus, 19 N.D. at 330-31, 124 N.W. at 72. According to the North Dakota
Supreme Court, the public trial provisions of the state's Constitution were enacted to
prevent public prosecutors or courts from engaging in the evils of secret trials. Id. at 330,
124 N.W. at 72. However, public trials in the literal sense were never construed to have
been granted. Id. at 331, 124 N.W. at 72. Rather, the public trial provisions are held to be
subject to reasonable construction. Id. at 331, 124 N.W. at 72.
94. Nyhus, 19 N.D. at 331, 124 N.W. at 72, 73.
95. Nyhus, 19 N.D. at 331-34, 124 N.W. at 73-74. The North Dakota Supreme Court
intended that only children and those persons who were truly curiosity seekers be
excluded. Id. at 332-33, 124 N.W. at 73-74.
96. See id. at 331-32, 124 N.W. at 73-74 (discussion of public morals, decency, and
motives for attending). Closing the courtroom to protect public morals was apparently
common at that time. See Note, Right of Access, supra note 18, at 363 (examples of closing
to protect public morals in cases from the 1890's); Note, Courtroom Closure, supra note 18,
at 641-42 (citing an 1897 Michigan opinion, People v. Yeager, 113 Mich. 228, 71 N.W. 491
(1897), that sought to protect public morality).
97. KFGO Radio v. Rothe, 298 N.W.2d 505, 512-13 (N.D. 1980). KCO involved the
right of access of news media to a state's attorney inquiry into a possible felony act causing
death. Id. at 507.
98. Id. at 512-13. Despite the occurrence of important justifications for closing a
criminal proceeding, the North Dakota Supreme Court indicated in response to an appeal
of an order denying a defendant's request for closure, that a defendant does not have an




exclude spectators during the trial of cases of a "scandalous or
obscene nature." 99
In 1983 the news media challenged the closing of a prelimi-
nary hearing in a murder case and sought a supervisory writ from
the North Dakota Supreme Court. °0 The North Dakota Supreme
Court emphasized the difference between a preliminary hearing
and a trial and indicated that the constitutional provisions requir-
ing open courts did not apply with the same force and effect to
pretrial proceedings as they did to trials.' 0 ' The court explained
that while preliminary proceedings generally should be open,
where there was a substantial likelihood that the defendant's right
to a fair trial before an impartial jury would be jeopardized, clo-
sure would be justified.1
0 2
Again, in 1986, the news media challenged the closure of a
pretrial proceeding. 10 The North Dakota Supreme Court upheld
its 1983 ruling on this issue and expanded its discussion of the com-
peting values, including a lengthy footnote explaining the various
societal interests advanced by open proceedings.104 The supreme
court then set out the procedure that a trial court must follow in
order to properly close a preliminary examination.10 5 Citing both
Waller and Press-Enterprise I, the court held the following: 1)
bare assertions of counsel would be insufficient and the judge
should perform an independent evaluation of the anticipated evi-
dence and adverse publicity that could harm the defendant's right
99. KFGO, 298 N.W.2d at 513. See N.D. CENT. CODE 4 27-01-02 (Supp. 1989Xwhen
persons may be excluded from public court proceedings). The statute does not clearly
indicate whether the original intent of the clause allowing exclusion of spectators during
proceedings involving scandalous or obscene matters was for the protection of public
morals, as in the 1909 Nyhus case, or for the protection of the victim. N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 27-01-02 (Supp. 1989). See Nyhus, 19 N.D. at 331-33, 124 N.W. at 73-74 (concern for the
protection of public morals). However, the court in KFGO may have harbored a concern
for the protection of children when, after citing the North Dakota Statute on closure, it
commented on the legitimate closure of juvenile courts. KFGO, 298 N.W.2d at 513 (citing
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-01-02 (Supp. 1989)).
100. Dickinson Newspapers, Inc. v. Jorgensen, 338 N.W.2d 72, 74 (N.D. 1983). The
defendant was charged with four counts of murder and one count of attempted murder. Id.
Upon agreement with the state's attorney, the defendant requested the closing of the
preliminary hearing. Id.
101. Id. at 75.
102. Id. at 79. The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that pretrial publicity of
inadmissible evidence could destroy the defendant's right to a fair public trial. Id.
103. Minot Daily News v. Holum, 380 N.W.2d 347, 348 (N.D. 1986). The defendants,
charged with murder, robbery, and felonious restraint, requested the closure of the
preliminary examination. Id.
104. Id. at 349. The court listed six societal interests advanced by open proceedings:
1) promoting discussion of governmental affairs; 2) promoting public confidence in and
respect for the judicial system; 3) providing a therapeutic outlet for community concern,
hostility, and emotion; 4) checking corrupt practices; 5) enhancing the performance of the
persons involved; and 6) discouraging perjury. Id. at 349 n.3.
105. Id. at 349.
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to a fair trial; 2) the trial court must consider alternatives; 3) any
closure must be narrowly tailored, excluding people only to the
extent necessary to protect the right to a fair trial; 4) the trial court
must make and articulate findings to support closure; and 5) the
public must be provided with adequate notice and the opportu-




In State v. Klein, °7 the North Dakota trial court's concern was
for the child victim's welfare and ability to testify in an open
trial.' 08 The trial judge ordered the courtroom cleared of all but a
select group of people in order to protect these interests.' 9 The
North Dakota Supreme Court recognized an important interest in
safeguarding a minor victim's welfare, but ruled that the closure in
this case improperly deprived the defendant of a public trial." 0
The court did not rule that closure during a child victim's testi-
mony was never justified.' Rather, the court espoused the posi-
tion that protecting such victims was an important interest and
may justify closure in certain instances."
2
In explaining its position, the supreme court first reviewed the
strong preference for public trials in both North Dakota and the
nation." 3 Further, the court emphasized the benefit public trials
provide to the accused and indicated that though a public trial was
not an absolute right, any motion to close a criminal proceeding
must show an overriding interest that would likely be prejudiced
106. Id. at 350. Cf. Walter v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984) and Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
107. 438 N.W.2d 798 (N.D. 1989).
108. Klein, 438 N.W.2d at 799, 802. See also Transcript of Motions Hearing, supra note
11, at 3-5 (indicating psychological and emotional pressures on the child warranted closure).
109. Klein, 438 N.W.2d at 799, 802. See also Transcript of Motions Hearing, supra note
11, at 3-5 (trial court's explanation after trial that closure was necessary to facilitate the
child's testimony).
110. Klein, 438 N.W.2d at 800. Without meeting the requirements of a hearing and
findings before closing the trial, the trial court erred and violated the defendant's sixth
amendment right to a public trial. Id. at 802 (citation omitted).
111. Id. at 801. The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that Globe recognized that
protecting a minor victim's welfare was a compelling interest, but that a particularized
determination showing the child needed protection was also required. Klein, 438 N.W.2d
at 801.
112. Klein, 438 N.W.2d at 802. The North Dakota Supreme Court cited two examples
from other states where the trial court failed to make adequate findings to support closure
during a minor victim's testimony. Id. at 801-02. See State v. Hightower, 376 N.W.2d 648,
649-50 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985Xspectators excluded during testimony of 10-year-old; reversed
because the prosecutor failed to articulate an overriding interest in danger of being
prejudiced and adequate findings to support closure); People v. Holveck, 171 II. App. 3d
38, -, 52 N.E.2d 1073, 1076, 1083 (1988), appeal granted, 122 l. 2d 585, 530 N.E.2d 256
(1988Xcourtroom closed during testimony of six-year-old; reversed because the record did
not reflect that the trial court had balanced the conflicting interests and evaluated the
factors necessary to override the defendant's sixth amendment public trial right).
113. Klein, 438 N.W.2d at 800.
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without closure. 114  In addition, the court pointed out that a
motion to close a trial to the public should ordinarily be made
before trial."
15
The North Dakota Supreme Court referred to Press-Enter-
prise 1116 which requires that an overriding interest be based on
clearly articulated findings which show that the requested closure
is both essential and narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
I17
The North Dakota Supreme Court also quoted the test for closure
as articulated in Waller" 8 which indicated that an overriding
interest must be one in danger of prejudice and that the court
must consider reasonable alternatives to closure." 19
The North Dakota Supreme Court in applying the test for clo-
sure found that the state's midtrial motion failed to provide spe-
cific facts adequate to justify closure.12 0  The supreme court
recognized that protection of a minor victim can qualify as an
overriding interest, but the trial court did not make the necessary
particularized determination that the child witness in Klem
needed protection.' 2 ' The supreme court stated, "There was no
hearing, no weighing of competing interests, and no findings to
support closure. ' 12
114. Id. at 800 (citing Douglas v. Wainwright, 739 F.2d 531 (11th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985Xcourt closed during testimony of key witness in a love triangle
murder case)).
115. Klein, 438 N.W.2d at 800. See N.D.R. CRIM. P. 17.1 (directions for an omnibus
hearing and pretrial conference). Rule 17.1 provides that the court should ascertain
whether any party intends to make additional motions at the hearing. N.D.R. CRIM. P.
17.1(b). Any pretrial motion which is not made at that omnibus hearing will be deemed
waived unless adequate information was not available to make the motion. N.D.R. CRIM. P.
17.1(b).
116. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984XPress-Enterprise I).
The United States Supreme Court ruled that the trial court improperly closed the
preliminary jury examination proceedings in a trial involving the rape and murder of a
teenager. Id. at 502, 510-11. The Court set forth the requirements for overcoming the
presumptions of openness in criminal proceedings. Id. at 510.
117. Klera, 438 N.W.2d at 801.
118. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984Xtrial court improperly closed a
suppression hearing over defendant's objection). The United States Supreme Court ruled
that the same requirements established to close a proceeding against the public's first
amendment right of access applied when the challenge to closure was based instead on the
defendant's sixth amendment right to a public trial. Id. at 45-48.
119. Klem, 438 N.W.2d at 801.
120. Id. at 800. The North Dakota Supreme Court explained that a movant must show
that he is entitled to the relief sought and that mere assertions of counsel are insufficient to
meet the threshold burden of showing the existence of an overriding interest that can only
be protected by closure. Id.
121. Klein, 438 N.W.2d at 801. The North Dakota Supreme Court indicated a
"particularized determination" required weighing such factors as the child's psychological
maturity, understanding, and desires, as well as the interests of the child's relatives. Id. at
802.
122. Id. at 801. The North Dakota Supreme Court indicated that the requirement of
findings is not simply to provide the reviewing court with something to review, but to
demonstrate that the trial court did weigh the competing interests. Id.
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In addition, the North Dakota Supreme Court discussed the
significance of allowing a news media person to remain in the
courtroom. 12 3 The court noted that while the reporter's presence
might have satisfied the public's first amendment right of access, it
did not satisfy the defendant's sixth amendment right to a public
trial.124 The majority concluded that noncompliance with the clo-
sure requirements as enunciated in Waller'2 constituted revers-
ible error.126 The harmless error rule was not applied in Klem
because the court could not measure the intangible loss to society
or the effect of the error on the trial.
1 27
Finally, the supreme court addressed the explanation offered
after the fact by the trial court to justify closure and deny the
defendant's motion for a new trial, by pointing out that such an
after-the-fact attempt to justify closure by the Georgia Supreme
Court was exactly what Waller invalidated.12 The North Dakota
Supreme Court summarized its position by stating, "Without hav-
ing weighed evidence as to such factors as the child victim's psy-
123. Klein, 438 N.W.2d at 801.
124. Id. In considering a supervisory writ requesting reversal of a closure order, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court observed that the trial court attempted to reconcile the
competing concerns of the public's rights and the victim's rights when it closed a
preliminary examination regarding the sexual assault of a minor to the public but not to the
press. State v. Circuit Court for Manitowoc County, 141 Wis. 2d 239, -, 414 N.W.2d 832,
834 (1987). The Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that despite an attempt to balance the
competing interests, a factual basis of specific findings supporting closure in this case and
utilizing the factors set out by the United States Supreme Court was, nevertheless, missing.
Manitowoc, 141 Wis. 2d at -, 414 N.W.2d at 839. Additionally, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court held that the trial court should articulate why the presence of the press would not
infringe on the victim's interests, while the public's presence would be an infringement. Id.
at -, 414 N.W.2d at 839.
125. 467 U.S. at 45.
126. Klein, 438 N.W.2d at 801. Several state courts have accorded with the majority in
Klein, and have found that an error in the public trial guarantee required a new trial.
Hightower, 376 N.W.2d at 650 (trial court erred in closing courtroom during testimony of
ten-year-old victim of sexual abuse); Holveck, 171 Ill. App. 3d at -, 524 N.E.2d at 1083,
1085 (1988Xcourtroom improperly closed to all public except the media during testimony
by six-year-old victims of sexual abuse); People v. Romain, 137 A.D.2d 848, 848, 525
N.Y.S.2d 313, 313 (1988Xcourt committed reversible error by closing courtroom during the
testimony of an undercover officer when no prior hearing had been held). In comparison,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court found that even if the trial judge "failed to touch all
bases" in ordering closure, a careful consideration of the entire record indicated that any
error was harmless and no new trial was required. State v. Fayerweather, 540 A.2d 353,
354 (R.I. 1988). In Fayerweather, the defendant was on trial for the molestation of a four-
year-old. Fayeruwather, 540 A.2d at 354. Although only a hearing on the child's
competency to testify was held in Fayerweather, the Rhode Island Supreme Court found
that the record clearly indicated that the interest advanced was important and was likely to
be harmed without restricting the number of people present when the child testified. Id.
Further, the court noted that the trial judge had considered the child's age, lack of
understanding of the nature of the crime, and psychological immaturity, and that his
limited closure reflected a consideration of alternatives as required in Rhode Island. Id.
127. Klein, 438 N.W.2d at 802. The court stated that a defendant need not prove
specific prejudice in order to obtain relief for a violation of his or her public trial right.
Klein, 438 N.W.2d at 802-03 (citing Waller, 467 U.S. at 49).
128. Klein, 438 N.W.2d at 801.
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chological maturity and understanding, his desires, and the
interests of his parents and other relatives, the trial court's state-
ments do not constitute the kind of 'particularized determination
in individual cases' required."'" 9 Therefore, the court remanded
Klein for a new trial, requiring the trial court to conduct a hearing
and make appropriate findings in accordance with the expressed
requirements if the state again sought closure.'3 0
The dissent in Klein 131 agreed that the trial court erred in
excluding the public during the child's testimony without a hear-
ing and findings as required by Waller.'1 2 The dissent also agreed
that specific prejudice need not be proved.133 However, the dis-
sent would have remanded for a hearing and an opportunity to
make findings. 134 If the court made findings justifying closure and
concluded that the persons who were excluded could properly be
excluded, then a new trial would be a windfall for the defend-
ant.'3 5 Further, the dissent would have reassigned the case to a
new district court judge from a different judicial district to facili-
tate a fresh and independent view of the relevant facts and the
issue involved.
136
Klein clearly indicates that parties seeking closure to protect a
child witness or facilitate the child's testimony face a difficult task.
While closure to protect child witnesses is not prohibited, consid-
erable stumbling blocks lie in that path. 37 This may be one factor
129. Klein, 438 N.W.2d at 802 (citing Globe, 457 U.S. at 611 n.27). Other state courts
which have dealt with the question of closure during a minor victim's testimony have also
found that merely referring to the "sensitive nature" of the testimony was not sufficient to
deny the defendant's constitutional right to a public trial. Hightower, 376 N.W.2d at 650
(trial court erred in closing courtroom during testimony of ten-year-old victim of sexual
abuse). Further, citing an "unnerving effect" or the desire to "make the unpleasant
experience of testifying as pleasant as possible" was also not adequate. Holveck, 171 Ill.
App. 3d at _ 524 N.E.2d at 1083 (courtroom improperly closed to all public except the
media during testimony by six-year-old victims of sexual abuse).
130. Klein, 438 N.W.2d 798, 803.
131. 438 N.W.2d at 803 (Erickstad, CJ., dissenting).
132. Klein, 438 N.W.2d at 803 (Erickstad, CJ., dissenting). See Waller, 467 U.S. at 48
(requiring findings adequate to demonstrate the necessity of closure).
133. Klein, 438 N.W.2d at 807 (Erickstad, C.J., dissenting).
134. Klein, 438 N.W.2d at 808 (Erickstad, CJ., dissenting). The position that a new
trial is not necessary unless a hearing indicated that those persons excluded were
improperly excluded is similar to the position taken in Waller. See Waller, 467 U.S. at 50
(suppression hearing improperly closed without adequate findings and the Supreme Court
determined a new trial was not required unless a new, public suppression hearing resulted
in the suppression of material evidence not suppressed in the first trial, or in a material
change in the parties positions). However, in Waller, though the suppression hearing was
closed, the case was tried to the jury in open court. Waller, 467 U.S. at 40, 43.
135. Klem, 438 N.W.2d at 808 (Erickstad, CJ., dissenting).
136. Id.
137. See Klein, 438 N.W.2d at 802-03 (North Dakota Supreme Court holding that
failure to comply with the closure requirements set forth in the United States Supreme
Court opinions was reversible error).
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contributing to the search for alternatives by both state legisla-
tures and legal scholars. 138 Nevertheless, if closure is deemed the
best route in a particular case, the party seeking closure must show
how and why the child would be injured.' 39 This showing should
utilize factors such as the child's age and psychological maturity,
his or her understanding and desires, the nature of the crime, and
the interests of the child's parents and relatives.' 40  The party
seeking closure must also show that the closure is "no broader than
necessary" by explaining exactly who should be excluded and
why. 14' Reasonable alternatives must be considered; therefore,
the reasons other alternatives are not suitable should be clearly
articulated along with supporting facts.1
4 2
Danta M.Q. Bolin
138. See N.D.R. EVID. 803(24Xcited at N.D.R. OF COURT ANN. (1990-91)):
(24) Child's State About Sexual Abuse. An out-of-court statement by a child
under the age of 12 years about sexual abuse of that child or witnessed by that
child is admissible as evidence (when not otherwise admissible under another
hearsay exception) if-
(a) The trial court finds, after hearing upon notice in advance of the trial of
the sexual abuse issue, that the time, content, and circumstances of the
statement provide sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness; and
(b) The child either:
(i) Testifies at the proceedings; or
(ii) Is unavailable as a witness and there is corroborative evidence of
the act which is the subject of the statement.
Id. See also Whitcomb, Child Victims in Court: The Limits of Innovation, 70 JUDICATURE
90 (1986Xlists and discusses measures attempted to reduce stress and trauma of child wit-
nesses including closed circuit television, videotaped statements, hearsay exceptions, modi-
fication of physical environment, and support techniques such as a guardian ad litem to
prepare and accompany the child); Kuzins, The Child Witness, 11(8) CALIF. L. 24
(1988Xreview of a videotape demonstration urging judges and lawyers to modify their
courtroom behavior to accommodate child witnesses). Even if the courtroom is closed to
the general public, many people may still be present since the closure may be "no broader
than necessary." Waller, 467 U.S. at 48. Further, the child must still face the defendant
and cross examination. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988Xdiscussion of issues involved
with the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment).
139. Klein, 438 N.W.2d at 801-03. See also Waller, 467 U.S. at 48 (party seeking
closure must advance an overriding interest which is likely to be prejudiced).
140. Klern, 438 N.W.2d at 801-02. See Globe, 457 U.S. at 608 (listing some of the
factors to be weighed in determining if a child witness is in need of protection).
141. See Klein, 438 N.W.2d at 801 (citing Waller, 467 U.S. at 48, holding that closure be
no broader than necessary to protect the overriding interest). See also State v. Circuit
Court for Manitowoc County, 141 Wis.2d 239, -, 414 N.W.2d 832, 839 (1987Xtrial court
erred in failing to articulate why allowing members of the press to remain would not
infringe on the compelling interest of protecting the child witness while allowing the public
to remain would be an infringement).
142. See Klen, 438 N.W.2d at 801 (citing the requirements from Waller); Waller, 467
U.S. at 48 (indicating reasonable alternatives must be considered and findings made to
support any closure); Press-Enterprise 1, 464 U.S. at 510 (indicating findings must be
articulated specifically enough for a reviewing court to determine whether the closure was
proper).
